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Abstract There is substantial evidence that the human lan-
guage capacity (LC) is a species-specific biological property,
essentially unique to humans, invariant among human groups,
and dissociated from other cognitive systems. Each language,
an instantiation of LC, consists of a generative procedure that
yields a discrete infinity of hierarchically structured expres-
sions with semantic interpretations, hence a kind of “language
of thought” (LOT), along with an operation of externalization
(EXT) to some sensory-motor system, typically sound. There
is mounting evidence that generation of LOT observes
language-independent principles of computational efficiency
and is based on the simplest computational operations, and
that EXT is an ancillary process not entering into the core
semantic properties of LOT and is the primary locus of the
apparent complexity, diversity, and mutability of language.
These conclusions are not surprising, since the internal system
is acquired virtually without evidence in fundamental re-
spects, and EXT relates it to sensory-motor systems that are
unrelated to it. Even such properties as the linear order of
words appear to be reflexes of the sensory motor system, not
available to generation of LOT. The limited evidence from the
evolutionary record lends support to these conclusions, sug-
gesting that LC emerged withHomo sapiens or not long after,
and has not evolved since human groups dispersed.
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Evidently, we can study the evolution of some system only to
the extent that we know what it is. In the present case, what
has evolved is not languages, which do not evolve, in the
technical sense of the term, any more than states of the visual
system evolve. Rather, what has evolved is the capacity for
language (LC), analogous to the genetic basis for a mamma-
lian, not insect, visual system.1
The study of the evolution of LC was opened, and given a
solid basis, by Eric Lenneberg in his classic Biological
Foundations of Language (1967). Among many other contri-
butions, Lenneberg reviewed the sharp divergence between
human language and the symbolic systems of other animals
and the dissociations of language from other cognitive pro-
cesses. These discoveries and insights have since been con-
siderably extended and deepened. He also discussed the bio-
logical plausibility of qualitative discontinuity, a conclusion
that is also much better grounded today—and a logical neces-
sity for accounting for the emergence of systems of discrete
infinity such as human language, which may indeed be unique
in this regard, and the root of others, such as knowledge of
arithmetic, a matter that greatly concerned Darwin and
Wallace.
LC appears to be a true species property, unique to humans
in essentials and invariant among human groups, indicating
that it has undergone little if any evolutionary change at least
since our ancestors left Africa some 60,000 ya—possibly
about twice that long, as some very recent genomic studies
have indicated. Because of the apparent uniformity and stabil-
ity of LC, the theory of theory of LC has in recent decades
been called “universal grammar” (UG), adapting a traditional
notion to a new biological context. UG is not to be confused
with generalizations about surface properties, a topic that has
been studied in highly informative ways, notably by Joseph
Greenberg, but an entirely different one.
1 For further detail, throughout, see Berwick and Chomsky (2016), and
sources cited.
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The most salient property of LC is that languages consist
of a discrete infinity of structured expressions that are inter-
pretable in a definite way by the conceptual–intentional
system (CI) of thought and action and by a sensory-motor
system (SM) for externalization, thus yielding a sound-
meaning correlation over an infinite range, though the
sound system, while convenient, is only one option. LC is
thus based on a generative computational system (GEN)
consisting of combinatorial operations that operate on
atomic elements of the lexicon to yield the two interface
representations. At the CI interface, GEN yields a kind of
“language of thought” (LOT); in different terminology, a
system of “conceptual structures” (CS). The lexicon in-
cludes substantive terms (word-like elements, though not
words) and others that play a role in GEN.
The study of evolution of LC therefore seeks to establish
the nature of the Lexicon and of the combinatorial operations
of GEN. As to the former, there is solid evidence that the terms
of human languages are radically different from those of ani-
mal symbolic systems. The latter appear to be associated with
mind-independent events, while even the simplest human
terms violate this condition, an insight tracing back to classical
Greece. There is, in short, no “word–object/thing” relationship
for human language, though terms and more complex expres-
sions of language may be used to refer to mind-external ob-
jects, a different matter. The evolutionary origin of even the
most elementary human concepts/terms is a mystery, particu-
larly those used to refer, and hence to relate the internal lan-
guage to the external world. Even the task of giving accurate
descriptions of these fundamental elements has barely been
undertaken.2
Turning to GEN, one of its crucial properties, which came
to light as soon as the first efforts were undertaken to construct
explicit accounts of language (generative grammars), is struc-
ture-dependence: the operations of GEN apply to structures,
not strings, even ignoring such elementary properties of exter-
nalized expressions as linear order. Thus, quite generally, op-
erations keep to minimal distance, but in such expressions as
“the man and the woman copula angry at reflexive,” the cop-
ula and reflexive are plural, agreeing with the closest phrase
(the man and the woman), not singular, agreeing with the
linearly closest possible antecedent (the woman).
To take a more interesting case, consider (1):
(1) Which girls and boys did the men expect to like each
other
Like other anaphors, each other seeks the closest potential
antecedent. However, it skips the men, instead choosingwhich
girls and boys, ignoring linear (and even structural) order,
raising questions to which we will return.
Similar cases abound. Consider (2), (3):
(2) birds that fly instinctively swim
(3) instinctively, birds that fly swim
Sentence (2) is ambiguous: “fly instinctively” or “instinctive-
ly swim”; (3) is unambiguous: “instinctively swim.” Again, the
construal rule that relates the adverb to the verb ignores linear
distance and observes minimal structural distance.
Structure-dependence holds for all relevant constructions
in all languages. That universal property would be paradoxical
if linear order were available to GEN, since linear distance is
far more easily computed than structural distance. The only
plausible conclusion is that linear order is simply not available
to generation of the core semantic properties at CI. Other
suggestions have been made, but those that are clear enough
to investigate quickly collapse on inspection.3
We conclude, then, that there is a fundamental asymmetry
between the two interfaces: GEN yields an infinite array of
structured expressions at CI (LOT/CS). Ancillary operations
of externalization map the structures produced by GEN to
some sensory modality, introducing linear order and other
properties that are required by SM but are irrelevant to core
semantic/conceptual properties of language.
Much other evidence supports this conclusion, including
simple semantic facts. Thus, languages can have head-
complement or complement-head order (say, VO or OV),
the head parameter, but the semantic relationships are identi-
cal, a fact that generalizes widely (with apparent exceptions
that go beyond the discussion here). Or consider again (1). Its
interpretation at CI is, loosely, (4):
(4) for which girls and boys, the men expected those girls
and boys to like each other
That would follow directly if what is generated at CI is (5),
with two copies of the phrase which girls and boys, in which
case each other, as expected, selects the closest potential ante-
cedent (as always ignoring linear order, hence ignoring boys):
(5) [which girls and boys] did the men expect [which girls
and boys] to like each other
Accordingly, we expect UG to determine that (5) is gener-
ated at CI, while the externalized form (1) is derived by dele-
tion of a copy, thus minimizing internal and SM computation.
What reaches the mind, then, is (5), while what reaches the
mouth/ear is (1), violating minimal distance, a matter of no
concern given the basic architecture of LC, with its fundamen-
tal asymmetry of interfaces. Far more intricate cases of seman-
tic interpretation fall under the same mechanisms.
2 For review and sources, see Chomsky (2013). 3 See Berwick et al. (2011).
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Awide variety of linguistic evidence supports the conclusion
that externalization is an ancillary process, with properties that
are in part a reflex of SM. There is independent support from
psycholinguistics and the neurosciences. One productive para-
digm has been to present subjects with two kinds of artificial
languages, onemodeled on a human language, thus conforming
to UG, the other violating UG, for example, with rules that use
linear order—say, negating a sentence by placing the negative
particle after the third word, a rule far simpler to compute than
actual linguistic rules. It turns out that, in the case of conformity
to UG, there is normal activation in the language areas, though
not when linear order is used. In that case, the task is interpreted
as a non-linguistic puzzle, or so brain activity indicates. Work
by Neil Smith and Ianthi-Maria Tsimpli with a cognitively im-
paired but linguistically fluent subject reached similar conclu-
sions. They also found that normals were unable to deal with
the violations of UG using linear order if the task was presented
to them as linguistic, though they could handle the problem if it
was presented as a puzzle.4
Though many questions remain, the basic architectural
asymmetry appears to be reasonably well established. It has
many consequences. One is that uses of language that depend
on externalization, notably communication, are even more
peripheral to the nature of language, contrary to widely held
beliefs. The asymmetry also illustrates again the sharp disso-
ciation of language from animal symbolic systems.
A problem that arises at once is the apparent variety, diver-
sity, and easy mutability of language, properties that appear to
be inconsistent with the conclusion that UG is a species prop-
erty, not having evolved throughout detectable human history.
The problemwould be resolved if these properties of language
are confined, perhaps completely, to the lexicon and to exter-
nalization (hence to the SM interface). There is substantial
evidence supporting this conclusion. In particular, investiga-
tion of languages of wide typological variety has repeatedly
shown that apparent sharp differences in underlying struc-
tures—for example, “flat” vs highly structured expres-
sions—dissolve under deeper inquiry,5 lending support to
the conclusion that the core system generating CI is close to
uniform, as we should expect simply from the fact that it is
acquired with little direct evidence, in many cases none at all.
Still, a question arises about the evolution of the options of
variation—“parameters” as they have been called in recent
work. The optimal conclusion would be that they did not
evolve at all. Some might represent alternative solutions to
the cognitive problem of relating a virtually invariant system
that may satisfy conditions of minimal computation to SM
systems that had long been in place and are unrelated to it.
Another possibility is that parameters, at least many of them,
do not exist. They are options left open by GEN and the
overarching principles of minimal computation. Consider
again the head parameter. It is simply a mismatch between
GEN, which assigns no order, and the SM systems that require
it. Languages have to make a choice for externalization, and
do it one way or another. English and Japanese, for example,
are virtual mirror images. Note that the options resulting from
mismatch lend further support to the conclusion that the inter-
nal system lacks order and other surface arrangements.6
Pursuing further the nature of what has evolved, UG, con-
sider again (1). It illustrates the ubiquitous property of
dislocation: phrases that are heard in one position are
interpreted both there and somewhere else, in a position where
similar phrases can appear. Like structure-dependence, that
property has been regarded as highly problematic from the
earliest days of generative grammar.
The challenge is to explain why UG should have such
properties as the ones reviewed here. There is a very straight-
forward answer, which holds over a substantial range: GEN
observes language-independent principles of computational
efficiency, and UG itself is based on the simplest computa-
tional operation, call it Merge, an operation that is embedded
somehow in every more complex computational procedure:
take two objects X and Yalready constructed and form a new
object Z without modifying X or Y, or imposing any further
structure on them: thus Merge(X,Y) = {X,Y}.
This elementary assumption suffices to yield the observa-
tions discussed above: the asymmetry of the interfaces and the
locus of surface complexity and variety; the ubiquity of dislo-
cation; structure-dependence; minimal structural distance for
anaphoric and other construal; and the difference between
what reaches the mind for semantic interpretation and what
reaches the mouth and ear. I will not run through the explana-
tion, presented elsewhere (see note 1). Instead, a few words on
the possible evolution of LC (UG).
Empirical evidence on evolution of LC is very slight. One
assumption, already mentioned, can be put forth with fair
confidence: there has been little or no evolution of language
(that is, of LC) since our ancestors left Africa and quickly
spread all over the world. A second fact is that evidence for
non-trivial forms of symbolic behavior date to not long before
that time, less than 100,000 ya. And there is no convincing
evidence of LC in any species other than Homo sapiens (pre-
sumably with date of origin about 200,000 ya). So we are
considering very brief periods of evolutionary time, even if
the dates are somewhat extended.
Recall that there are two basic problems: the origins of the
lexical/conceptual atoms and of GEN. On the former, there is
very little to say, particularly for the terms used to refer and to
relate internal language to the world. On GEN, the simplest
assumption consistent with the limited evidence about evolution
4 Musso et al. (2003). Smith (2004); Smith and Tsimpli (1996).
5 For one very important example (of many), see Legate (2002).
6 See Moro (2008), 107. For detailed development of these ideas, see
Obata, Epstein and Baptista (2015).
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and what is known about what evolved is that some, perhaps
relatively small, rewiring of the brain produced the simplest
computational operation, accessing the lexicon and thus yield-
ing LOT/CS and the capacity for thought, planning, reflection,
and creativity, over an (in principle) unbounded range. Yielding
selectional advantages, the trait might have proliferated through
a small community, over time providing the motive for devising
a mode of externalization of the internally generated linguistic
expressions that express thoughts.7 That poses the cognitive
problem of relating an internal system that might conform close-
ly to principles of computational efficiency to SM systems that
have no special relationship to it, a problem that can be solved in
many ways, possibly by just solving the mismatch problems,
perhaps with little if any further evolution of any significance.
These are, it seems, the simplest assumptions that would yield
an outcome satisfying the observations about LC discussed
here. And they appear to be consistent with the very limited
evidence available about the evolution of LC.
Needless to say, these remarks only scratch the surface of
what is at all understood, let alone the vast array of questions
yet to be addressed.
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